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Defeating the Islamic State: A How-To Guide

September 11, 2014

Last night President Barack Obama addressed the nation, explaining his plan to degrade and defeat the Islamic State. I liked much of what I heard, with the “better late than never” caveat, but I long ago grew skeptical of Obama’s speeches, which often over-promise and under-deliver, so I will be suitably impressed if this plan is actually carried out. I’m not convinced that the suggested counterterrorism templates of Somalia and Yemen are ideal for employment in this case, but at this point any bias for presidential action against the murderous Islamic State is welcome.

We already have the nay-sayers, complaining about the lack of an “exit strategy,” as well as bellowing from George W. Bush-era strategists who, having failed to make their counterinsurgency dreams come true in Iraq the last time, are determined to harass President Obama until he makes the same mistakes. Fortunately, he will not, and the potshots of yesterday’s soi-disant war-makers can be ignored.

I recently explained what a successful strategy to defeat the Islamic State should look like, involving the aggressive application of U.S. and Allied airpower in combination with local proxies on the ground. This approach is attritional — there will be no “big wins” in this fight — and imperfect, but it is the only practical strategy at present. Putting large numbers of American “boots on the ground” in Iraq to defeat an uprising would be a fool’s errand now (it always was, but that’s another story). That said, the addition of superb American Special Operations Forces, the world’s most lethal covert killers,  to this strike package will degrade the Islamic State’s military capacity over time, meaning years not months, and will lead to its ultimate defeat in the Middle East. It remains to be seen if Obama will actually do this, but the path to victory is clear for those inside the Beltway who wish to find it.

I also advised Washington, DC, to get serious about the jihadist threat in other ways, such as dropping security-as-theater and dealing with real threats in a straightforward and adult manner. This, alas, seems unlikely to happen in this administration — though, to be fair, it didn’t happen under Obama’s predecessor either (indeed, the current occupant of the White House has continued, not created, most of this silliness). Institutionalized escapism has become a fully bipartisan American political trait, with baleful consequences for our national security and much beyond.

Nevertheless, it ought to be made clear that the Islamic State threat in Iraq and Syria is ultimately manageable as long as the United States is willing to employ persistent force in combination with partners. If we fail to do so, others — meaning above all Iran — are far less squeamish than we are in such affairs, and will annihilate Salafi jihadists in their region, along with lots of civilians, if we refuse battle. The Pasdaran, Iran’s feared Revolutionary Guards Corps, is not encumbered, as Western militaries are, by platoons of lawyers and restrictive Rules of Engagement. We may not like the consequences of Tehran taking the lead in this struggle, however.

The real threat presented by the Islamic State is to the West itself, thanks to the vast and unprecedented numbers of Westerners who have joined the jihad in Iraq and Syria. Even top-notch European security services are already overwhelmed by the size and scope of this threat, with hundreds of European jihadists returning home every month, fresh from battle on behalf of the Islamic State, and ready to cause mayhem and recruit others for the jihad.

What, then, is to be done? What does strategic victory over Salafi jihadists look like? I hinted here:

The military defeat of the Islamic State by Western airpower and commandos, aided by local proxies, will set the stage for the strategic defeat of their movement. What must follow is a version of what I term Special War, tailored for counterterrorism, combining offensive counterintelligence, denial and deception, and long-term manipulation of the jihadists leading to their collapse and self-immolation.

To vanquish the Salafi jihad in the West, where the Islamic State wishes to perpetrate acts of terror on a scale even Osama bin Laden never attempted, its infrastructure in Europe and beyond must be put out of business. This growing cadre of extremists among us in the West, what I term the Sixth Column, actually is comparatively easy to defeat, since their skills in counterintelligence and operational security — the vital tools of any successful terrorist group — are customarily lacking, indeed often laughably weak. Although they are paranoid about spies in their midst, which constitutes a critical weakness for them, Salafi jihadists (unlike, for instance, Iranian-trained Hizballah) are seldom adept at rooting them out effectively.

Taking a page from the Russians, who are masters of this dark art, this is where a counterterrorism strategy based on provocation is needed. It is not difficult to cause terrorists, particularly inexperienced ones longer on radical talk than effective action, to do self-defeating things, thereby discrediting their virulent message. It is not necessary to perpetrate “false flag” terrorism to defeat the terrorists — which, although highly successful in many cases, is something which no law-based democracy could countenance. Instead, through careful application of offensive counterintelligence coupled with denial and deception, in a patient and holistic manner, Western states together can undo the Salafi jihad movement in the West before it grows unmanageably dangerous.

This would be simply a 21st century version of the Second World War’s British Double-Cross System after which this blog is named: employing multidisciplinary counterintelligence, aggressively applied in a strategic manner, to gain control of the enemy’s intelligence apparatus and thereby blind him and render him vulnerable to mistakes, confusion, and self-deception.

Western security services actually have considerable experience with such messy matters more recently than the Second World War. The British managed a small-scale version of this in Northern Ireland, leading to the ultimate defeat of the IRA in any military sense by the early 1990s, thereby paving the way for long-term peace in that troubled province. In Germany today, the Neo-Nazi movement is so thoroughly swiss-cheesed with government agents, at the highest levels, as to be more or less an appendage of the domestic security service. America is no slouch in this shadowy department either. Hoover’s FBI in the 1960s and early 1970s did a commendable job with its Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in disabling far-left and far-right groups in a comprehensive manner without killing anyone. (I know the mere mention of COINTELPRO brings nostalgics on the Left into a lather; I notice they object less when the identical offensive counterintelligence techniques, applied by the FBI, broke the back of the Ku Klux Klan.)

The issue is will more than capability. If we are not willing to apply non-lethal counterintelligence techniques against the Islamic State, which is vastly more dangerous than the IRA, the Weathermen, the Black Panthers, or the KKK, we may wish to consider giving up now. Applying offensive counterintelligence in a strategy based on penetration and provocation is a messy business, and there will be mistakes, but it is not based on killing, neither does it involve invading other people’s countries, much less occupying them.

Assassination is a legitimate technique against virulent terrorists, but it is a dangerous tool that must be applied carefully; it can be overused as well as misused, with bad consequences for any democracy. Moreover, provocation done right leads terrorists to kill each other, rather than innocent people. Every hour Salafi jihadists spend trying to detect moles in their ranks is an hour they are not building bombs, spreading hate, and learning to fly airliners. Offensive counterintelligence, strategically applied, is highly effective at growing lethal paranoia in the minds of the already pretty paranoid.

We need not reinvent the wheel here. The implosion of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) offers an ideal template. Back in the mid-1980s, the ANO was one of the world’s most feared terrorist organizations, responsible for murder and mayhem across Europe and the Middle East, including the deaths of several Americans. Abu Nidal had been thrown out of Arafat’s PLO for his violent madness, becoming the world’s arch-terrorist during the mid-Reagan years. (Providing the spark for Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon was one of his more consequential terrorist acts.) Then, suddenly, he disappeared from the radar and went Elvis.

What happened was Abu Nidal killed off his own organization. A long-term deception operation by several intelligence services (including American), working together, convinced the already half-mad Abu Nidal that his group was swarming with spies and traitors. Instead of finding these (mostly mythical) moles, Abu Nidal decided to basically kill everyone. Over a few months in 1987-88, he unleashed his fearsome security force against his own people, murdering about 600 ANO members, many of them tortured to death in a medieval fashion. Some 170 terrorists were murdered in a single terrible night. With half the group dead and the other half terrified and demoralized, Abu Nidal fled to Baghdad with the remnants of the ANO, under Saddam Hussein’s protection, where they remained until the Americans arrived in the spring of 2003. (U.S. intelligence very much wanted to find Abu Nidal, but it turned out he was dead, ostensibly after having shot himself….several times.)

The Islamic State represents a far more serious and persistent threat to the West than any Palestinian terrorists ever did, and they merit at least as tenacious and cunning counterterrorism techniques applied against them as were used against the ANO. There is considerable false morality at work if we are willing to use drones to kill thousands of terrorists — and along with them hundreds of innocents from “collateral damage” — not to mention occupying countries for years with awful humanitarian consequences, but we are unwilling to wage Special War, which is far less expensive in blood, treasure, and morality.

But will does not represent the only challenge. There are bureaucratic issues at play as well, as there always are in the real world of espionage, which day-to-day has a lot more to do with jockeying for institutional influence, budgetary cat-fights, and endless PowerPoint presentations than actual spying. In the first place, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is not conditioned to think in strategic terms; by its very nature it’s about tactics, not the big picture. Therefore it may be necessary to create a new organization — small, select, elite, and very secretive — to wage Special War against terrorists (and against troublesome states like Russia too: the counterintelligence methods employed are more or less identical against both state and non-state actors) that can think and act strategically, not just tactically.

Over a decade ago I briefed this concept in classified detail to IC and DOD seniors and was told it was “impossible” — they meant bureaucratically of course. When DC rice bowls win, so do the terrorists. In 1942, FDR created the shadowy Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA — over the strenuous objection of the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, who all (rightly) saw their secret rice bowls getting dented — with a pen-stroke, and there is no reason something similar cannot be done today by any president, if there exists the will to do so.

There is also the touchy matter of keeping secrets. Simply put, if we cannot keep Special War out of the newspapers, there is no point in doing it. Beyond the issue of leaks, which all White Houses of late have been prone to, the Snowden disaster raises troubling questions about the ability of the IC and DOD to protect its most cherished secrets. Until Washington, DC, can get serious about security clearances and merely defensive counterintelligence, it would be a mistake to embark on any shadowy offensive counterintelligence campaign against the Islamic State, which must be kept secret for decades to be effective.

Seriousness, then, is the real issue. If the West wants to win this war, it will. We cannot lose to a cabal of neo-medieval barbarians, we can only defeat ourselves. The Islamic State is murderous and fanatical, but not yet accomplished in international terrorism. It is imperative that we defeat them before they learn those deadly skills and apply them against our homelands, as they ardently wish to. Today, the thirteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the day that opened the new era of Western counterterrorism, it is high time, at last, to seriously start thinking strategically — not just tactically — about victory over Salafi jihadism and how to achieve it.

24 Comments
  1. Robert Marchenoir permalink

    Interesting, thank you. Especially the part about Abu Nidal.

  2. Heide permalink

    Thank you for your in depth article

  3. Douglas Walsworth permalink

    It is hard for me to imagine an administration headed by a President who could not get a security clearance if he had to, being serious about security.

  4. want2no permalink

    “If the West wants to win this war, it will.”

    And it will only win if Obama’s words are matched with appropriate actions. To that end, I wonder if Obama’s heart is really in this or is he just responding to a situation he could no longer avoid? It becomes important if we are to see it through.

  5. uwe permalink

    Very good, but could you please elaborate on a view points?
    How would your strategy of attrition through special war differ from what the Israelis
    have been doing for -at least- 20 years? Where will you find proxies to fight your battles on the
    ground? Especially proxies whose methods the western public is able to stomach
    (remember Sabra and Shatila) and who are a bit more reliable than Dostum or Karzai?
    How will attrition through airpower work, if you have to use B1 bombers to destroy Hiluxes?
    It seems to me, that If the jihadists have a grand strategy, it is to wear their enemies down economically and morally. So if we (the western world) want to use “Zermürbung und Ermattung” (v. Falkenhayn) we ‘d better find cheaper ways. And how do we deal with states that are turning more and more to supporting the jihadists, like Turkey or Tunisia? And finally what would be a victory over the Jihadis? Get rid of the alltogether? Drive them underground again? Contain them to a specific region?

    • Proper reply would require a book on this — which is being worked on now — but the Israelis have become too reliant on US-type technology in CT. I am advocating something more covert and cunning that drone and air strikes.

      Final victory over Salafi jihadism will take decades, but we can shave years off that through Special War.

      • Bruno Paris permalink

        Thank you for your enlightenment. I have just discovered this blog and admit I’m hooked. I’m trying to catch up with all the past posts.

        I would like to ask you what’s your perspective/take on the root causes of this ‘jihadi wave’ as oppose to previous terrorist waves Europe has experienced in the 80’s ? What is the pull those jihadis have on young European recruits that no other terrorist organization had until now? I don’t believe they’re just all the blood thirsty monsters they’re made out to be by the MSM. This seems too simplistic.

        Not to discredit the benefits nor efficacy of the Special War you’re advocating, no matter how lasting they may be, but isn’t it a short term solution for a long term problem? Yesterday we had Abu Nidal and Bin Laden. Today we have Al Baghdadi and jihadi John. It seems to me that you kill one to see dozens joining ranks later.

      • We cannot kill our way out of the Salafi jihad problem, but we must kill to accomplish our broader aims.

        There are similarities between this wave and previous waves of European terrorism, certainly. My concern is that the dumbed-down Qutbism today that passes for Salafi ideology today is especially virulent and has greater appeal than we might want to admit.

  6. c6543 permalink

    If the West wants to survive, physically, it will want to win this war. We cannot lose to a cabal of neo-medieval barbarians, but we may well lose to a cabal of neo-bolshevik barbarians if we refuse to see the Fifth Column opening all the city gates for the Sixth Column to storm through.

    Refuse to see, what, where? Easy, where there is no trace of fear, but rather much gloating and gleeful expectations, and where there is actual suppression of all resistance to the IS/AQ/MB-pack.

    And we shouldn’t be so squeamish about who we call Westerners either. That pack of predators is not, were never and never will be our people.

    IS is spreading faster than Ebola right now, so it must above all be efficiently sealed off and put into quarantine, if necessary even a naval blockade must be considered.

  7. Brasil61 permalink

    good article except critique of W ..seems like you missed the election in Iraq.. and the winning of the peace all pissed away by constant barrage of media, politics and weak fake NATO allies attacking every minor or major mistake and setback against a fierce dedicated enemy..and the other enemies ..UN Russia China ect.. then throw in absurd rules of engagement..ect ect..

    W did as good as possible imo considering all circumstances

  8. AIM9 permalink

    @Brasil61,

    “good article except critique of W ..seems like you missed the election in Iraq.. and the winning of the peace”

    About a week ago I noted one of Ailes’ Blondes mentioning a CTC study highlighting all this IS stuff only coming about “four years ago” – the implication of course …

    Too bad the Blonde wasn’t familiar with an earlier (2007) CTC release, the very first sentence of its Introduction [pg 3];

    On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al‐Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al‐Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters.

    http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf

  9. miguel cervantes permalink

    the Sinjar files, shows there were many more foreign fighters, at the time his contingent was being attritted, the Kardashian comment to the Kagans seems like a cheap shot, imho,

  10. J. Daniel permalink

    I see your pondering was fruitful. Glad to see such a well written post on a day of remembrance. I think if there aren’t enough folks who know how to play the game of deception we could partner well. Everyone’s going to have a stake in this game soon enough and the lessons. India, China, Brazil, Turkey, West Africa, Thailand, Malaysia, etc. are all going to wake up to it.

    I was lucky to attend a recent book discussion with Mr. Kai Bird. A wonderful author he wrote about places and people (Dhahran, PLO) many find familiar while giving us a perspective on an unfamiliar career (Mr. Robert Ames.) Then at the end of a great book he goes into solving a whodunit. Why? Why now when the principals are in quiet and intense discussions? And why when the region is already in flames? One shouldn’t lament CIA lost HUMINT skills while poking them in the eye for practicing it.

    The fourth estate won’t become any more profitable or relevant by exposing Special War. Billionaires like Bezos and Slim can’t be too pleased with expose positional arms races either.

    +2 for noting false morality and Abu Nidal.

  11. mcgannonma permalink

    Can we just let the JSOC and SOCOM go back to what they do best and keep all of these operations out of the public eye, until these terrorist groups are finally defeated?

    • No, because JSOC and SOCOM, for all the skills they possess, lack the clandestinity that is vitally necessary to this undertaking. Also, I suggest you spend a day or two at SOCOM HQ in Tampa, it will immediately cure you of any notion that they possess magic powers.

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